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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Craig Charles Risdon appeals from his conviction for rape. He challenges 
the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
At the age of twenty-eight Risdon initiated a sexual relationship with a 15-
year-old girl, which lasted for about four months and resulted in her pregnancy. 
(PSI, pp. 1-2; R., pp. 71-73.) The state charged Risdon, by information filed on 
February 16, 2010, with two counts of statutory rape. (R., pp. 30-31.) Risdon 
was not arraigned on the charge until May 5,2010. (R., p. 34.) The delay was 
requested by Risdon, who wished to have the results of DNA testing on the infant 
born to the victim. (Tr., p. 7, L. 18 - p. 9, L. 1.1) At the arraignment the district 
court scheduled a pre-trial conference for July 28, 2010, and a jury trial for 
August 9, 2010. (R., p. 35.) 
On the date of the pre-trial conference the state moved to continue the 
trial. (R., p. 36.) The basis for the motion was that the lab scientist who had 
performed DNA testing establishing Risdon's paternity was unavailable for 
medical reasons due to complications from her own pregnancy. (R., p. 36; Tr., p. 
5, L. 24 - p. 6, L. 14.) When Risdon's counsel indicated that he did not believe 
he was authorized to waive statutory speedy trial rights (Tr., p. 6, L. 15 - p. 7, L. 
6) the state indicated it was willing to dismiss and re-file the charges (Tr., p. 7, 
1 There are two transcripts in the appellate record. Citations to "Tr." are to the 
transcript of the pre-guilty plea proceedings. 
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Ls. 7-12). The district court, however, indicated that it first wanted to consider 
whether the unavailability of the witness was good cause for trying Risdon later 
than the six-month statutory timeframe. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 13-15.) The trial court 
ultimately found good cause for the delay and continued the trial. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 
3-15; R., p. 40.) Because the scientist would be unavailable for about seven 
months, the prosecution agreed to attempt retesting, which would take 60 to 90 
days. (Tr., p. 9, L. 17 - p. 10, L. 12.) The district court then set the trial for about 
three months later, on November 1, 2010. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 13-24.) 
On September 16, 2010, about six weeks before trial, the state again 
moved to continue the trial on the basis that the state laboratory had declined to 
conduct re-testing. (R, p. 42.) This motion was also granted and the trial was 
scheduled for January 24, 2011. (R., pp. 4, 44.) 
On January 12, 2011, Risdon filed a motion to continue the trial and to 
dismiss the case claiming both constitutional and statutory speedy trial violations. 
(R., pp. 46-57, 90; Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-25.) The state opposed the motion to 
dismiss. (R., pp. 82-84, 87-89.) The district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
reaffirming its prior ruling that there was good cause for the delay due to witness 
unavailability. (Tr., p. 26, L. 9 - p. 30, L. 10; p. 31, L. 24 - p. 33, L. 3; R., pp. 92-
95.) 
Tacitly granting Risdon's motion to continue, the district court vacated the 
January 24, 2011 trial and scheduled a status conference for three days later, on 
January 27, 2011. (R., p. 5.) On that date the trial was rescheduled for February 
22, 2011. (R., pp. 6, 96-97.) Prior to trial the parties entered a negotiated 
2 
conditional plea agreement and Risdon pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, 
preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss on appeal. 
(R., pp. 98, 100-06.) Risdon filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of 
judgment. (R., pp. 129-36, 139-41.) 
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ISSUES 
Risdon states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Was Defendant's statutory right of speedy trial denied? 
2) Was Defendant denied his Constitutional right to a speedy 
trial? ... 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 21-22 (emphasis original).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. The district court concluded that the unavailability of a witness was good 
cause for continuing the trial beyond the six month timeframe imposed by 
statute. Has Risdon failed to show that unavailability of a crucial witness 
was not good cause to continue the trial? 
2. The scheduled January 24, 2011 trial would have occurred a little over 15 
months after the state filed its complaint. Does application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts and procedures in this case show that Risdon 
has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that there was 
no constitutional speedy trial violation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Risdon Has Failed To Show That Unavailabiiity Of A Crucial Witness Was Not 
Good Cause To Continue The Trial Under I.C. § 19-3501 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that the unavailability of a witness crucial to 
the state's case, due to a medical condition, constituted good cause to continue 
the trial scheduled for August 9, 2010, beyond the six month timeframe of I.C. § 
19-3501 (2). (Tr., p. 26, L. 9 - p. 30, L. 10; p. 31, L. 24 - p. 33, L. 3; R., pp. 92-
95.) Risdon has failed to show error on appeal because the medical 
unavailability of a crucial state's witness was good cause to continue the August 
9, 2010 trial setting beyond the six month statutory timeframe. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's statutory right to a 
speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 
255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The appellate court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but 
freely reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts found. kl 
C. Risdon Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Finding Of Good 
Cause To Continue The August 9,2010 Trial Date 
Under Idaho law a court must dismiss a case without prejudice to re-filing 
if the defendant is not brought to trial within six months of the filing of the 
information, "unless good cause to the contrary is shown." I.C. §§ 19-3501(2), 
19-3506. For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is a 
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substantial reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 
135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56,58,803 
P.2d 557, 559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P .2d 
1115,1117 (Ct. App. 1987»; accord State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113,116,29 P.3d 
949, 952 (2001). "Good cause" under the statute is synonymous with "sufficient 
reason" for not trying the defendant in the requisite timeframe. I.C. § 19-3502. 
A good cause determination under I.C. § 19-3501 may take into account 
the factors used in the constitutional speedy trial analysis2 to the extent that they 
bear on the sufficiency of the good cause itself. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 803 
P.2d at 936 (citing State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980)); see 
also State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8,10-11,27 P.3d 417, 419-320 (Ct. App. 
2001); State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547, 549-550, 211 P.3d 792, 794-795 (Ct. App. 
2009); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 899-903,231 P.3d 532, 544-548 (Ct. App. 
2010). There is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to delay 
a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial court. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d 
at 936). Ultimately, "whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial 
determination upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Clark, 135 Idaho 
at 260,16 P.3d at 936 (citing Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at 559; Stuart, 
113 Idaho at 496,745 P.2d at 1117). The trial court's discretion is not unbridled, 
2 The constitutional analysis requires balancing of length of delay, reasons for 
delay, defendant's promptness in asserting speedy trial rights, and prejudice to 
the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
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however, and its decision is subject to independent review on appeal. Young, 
136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936). 
In this case the state filed its information on February 16, 2010. (R, p. 
30.) The six-month timeframe thus required trial on or before August 16, 2010, 
absent good cause. Risdon's plea and arraignment after the information was 
filed was delayed 70 days upon stipulation of both parties, from February 24, 
2010, until May 5, 2010, in anticipation of DNA testing on the victim's baby to 
determine paternity. (Tr., p. 8, L. 14 - p. 9, L. 1; R, pp. 2-3.) Despite the delay, 
at the arraignment the district court scheduled the trial within the six month 
statutory time, for August 9,2010. (R, p. 35.) 
At the pretrial conference the state moved to continue the trial past the six 
month timeframe on the basis that the scientist at the lab who had established 
paternity through DNA testing of the baby was unavailable for trial due to a 
medical condition from a complication of her own pregnancy. (R, p. 36; Tr., p. 5, 
L. 24 - p. 6, L. 14.) The district court concluded that the witness was unavailable 
and that such unavailability constituted good cause to delay the trial until after 
August 16, 2010. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-15; R, p. 40.) Application of relevant law to 
these facts shows no error by the district court. 
It is well established that the unavailability of a witness constitutes a valid 
reason to justify delay of a trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972); 
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 
P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005). To demonstrate witness unavailability, the state 
is required to show more than mere inconvenience, i.e., that "attendance at trial 
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would be burdensome." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936; Davis, 141 
Idaho at 837, 118 P .3d at 169. Rather, "[t]rue unavailability suggests an 
unqualified inability to attend." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936. 
In this case the lab scientist who performed the DNA testing was 
unavailable for the August 9, 2010 trial "due to complications arising out of her 
pregnancy" for which she had been "ordered to bed rest." (Tr., p. 5, L. 23 - p. 6, 
L. 7; p. 7, Ls. 7-12.) The district court found this sufficient cause to continue the 
August 9,2010 trial setting beyond the six-month timeframe, in part because the 
defense had requested delay for the specific purpose of obtaining the DNA 
evidence and because the health of the DNA specialist was grounds for delay. 
(Tr., p. 9, Ls. 3-11.) Because the DNA scientist was truly unavailable because 
her health did not allow attendance at trial, the district court's finding of good 
cause is fully supported by the record and the law. 
The only appellate argument Risdon makes about delay of the August 9, 
2010 trial date is that "the DNA evidence was not essential to the State's case, 
but was cumulative, possibly conclusive, of the defendant's access with the 
victim." (Appellant's brief, p. 31.3) The state agrees that the DNA evidence was 
"conclusive" of "defendant's access with the victim" if "access with" is a 
euphemism for "having had sex with." That the state might still have prevailed 
3 Most of Risdon's argument is aimed at the continuance of the November 1, 
2010 trial date. (Appellant's brief, pp. 29-30 (lab should have been forced to 
retest DNA and therefore there was no good cause to continue November 1, 
2010 trial date). Risdon has made no attempt to show how this argument is 
relevant to the district court's July 28,2010 finding of good cause to continue the 
trial until after August 16, 2010. (Id.) 
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without its best evidence of the crime is hardly grounds for concluding that the 
district court erred. Risdon's argument is, in a word, meritless. 
The district court found good cause because a witness crucial to the 
state's case was unavailable for the scheduled trial due to complications to her 
pregnancy requiring her to be in bed. Risdon does not dispute that the witness 
was unavailable for trial within the six month statutory speedy trial timeframe. He 
has therefore failed to show any error in the district court's finding of good cause 
to continue the trial beyond that timeframe. 
II. 
Risdon Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding That 
There Was No Constitutional Speedy Trial Violation 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that there was no constitutional speedy trial 
violation. (Tr., p. 26, L. 9 - p. 30, L. 10; p. 31, L. 24 - p. 33, L. 3; R, pp. 92-95.) 
Risdon asserts the district court erred, arguing primarily that some delay must be 
attributed to the state laboratory's decision to not re-test the DNA. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 31-43.) Review of the district court's analysis in light of applicable law 
shows no error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether speedy trial rights have been violated is a mixed question of fact 
and law; on appeal, an appellate court defers to the district court's factual 
determinations, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the court's application of the law to the facts found. State v. Clark, 135 
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Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000); State v. McNew, 131 Idaho 268, 269, 
954 P.2d 686, 687 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Application Of The Four-Part Test Shows No Speedy Trial Violation 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a 
speedy triaL" State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 
2007). When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and 
federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113,117,29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); Lopez, 
144 Idaho at 352,160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,853,153 P.3d 
1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of 
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her 
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker, 
407 U.S. at 530. Balancing these four factors under the facts of this case shows 
no error by the trial court. 
1. Although Presumptively Prejudicial, The Delay Was Not So Long 
As To Weigh Heavily In Favor Of Finding A Violation 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for 
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the 
date there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints 
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imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho 
at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United States v. 
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) 
"Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the 
date formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the 
balancing test is triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of 
itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at 853,153 P.3d at 1199. 
In this case Risdon was arrested on October 28, 2009. (R., p.49.) The 
trial would have occurred, but for Risdon's motion to continue and to dismiss, on 
January 24, 2011. (R., pp. 44, 46.) Although the delay of about 15 months 
between the arrest and the date the trial would have been held is sufficient to 
trigger the Barker balancing test, it is not excessive. See State v. Campbell, 104 
Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Talmage, 
104 Idaho 249,252,658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983» ("A delay of [approximately 12 
months] is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether speedy trial has been 
denied."). This factor weighs only lightly toward any speedy trial violation, and is 
ultimately counter-balanced by other factors. 
2. Risdon Failed To Show That The Reasons For Delay He Did Not 
Agree To Were Not Justifiable 
Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial 
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 
11 
160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are assigned 
to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the 
Supreme Court: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A 
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances 
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to 
justify appropriate delay. 
kL at 531 (footnote omitted). 
Review of the record shows no deliberate effort to delay for trial 
advantage, and that in fact Risdon often sought delay when he believed it would 
be to his advantage. A chronology from the record shows the following: 
10/28/09 
11/12/09 
11/25/09 
12/30109 
1/20/10 
2/10/10 
2/16/10 
2/24/10 
5/5/10 
7/28/10 
9/16/10 
1/12/11 
Arrest in California (R., p. 49) 
Initial appearance; preliminary hearing scheduled for 
11/25/09 (R., p. 14) 
Stipulation to continue preliminary hearing while 
awaiting DNA test results (R., pp. 17-18,20) 
Stipulation to continue preliminary hearing while 
awaiting DNA test results (R., pp. 21-23) 
Stipulation to continue preliminary hearing while 
awaiting DNA test results (R., pp. 25-26) 
Risdon waives preliminary hearing, released on own 
recognizance (R., pp. 27-28) 
Information (R., pp. 30-31) 
Arraignment postponed at Risdon's request to get 
DNA test results (Tr., p. 8, L. 14 - p. 9, L. 1) 
Arraignment; pretrial scheduled for 7/28/10 and trial 
for 8/9/10 (R., pp. 34-35) 
State's motion to continue because witness 
unavailable granted, trial reset for 11/01/10 (R., pp. 
38-40) 
Trial continued on state's motion to 01/24/11 because 
of witness unavailability (R., pp. 42-44) 
Risdon's motion to continue trial and to dismiss (R., 
pp.46-47) 
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Thus, the record establishes that after Risdon's arrest and initial 
appearance he entered three stipulations delaying the preliminary hearing for 
approximately three months in anticipation of results of DNA testing. Risdon 
thereafter waived his preliminary hearing and the state filed its information, after 
which Risdon entered two additional stipulations, delaying his arraignment for 
over two months, again in anticipation of DNA testing being completed. At the 
arraignment the court set the pretrial conference within three months and the trial 
just more than three months after the arraignment. The record establishes that 
from October 16, 2009, to July 28, 2010, four months are attributable to normal 
process and five months of delay was specifically requested or agreed to by 
Risdon. 
The first delay that can at all be laid solely at the state's feet is the 
continuance granted July 28, 2010, resetting the trial for November 1, 2010. As 
noted above, this three-month delay was attributable to a crucial state's witness 
being confined to bed rest due to medical necessity arising from complications of 
pregnancy. In short, this delay was due to a valid reason justifying delay, which 
is not seriously challenged by Risdon. 
The next delay attributable to the state is the continuance of the 
November 1, 2010 trial date to January 12, 2011, again due to witness 
unavailability because of medical necessity. It is this delay of just over two 
months that Risdon ultimately claims is the relevant and prejudicial delay, 
because, Risdon argues, DNA retesting should have been done before this time. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 37-43.) Even assuming that Risdon were correct, and that 
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this delay was not justifiable, he has failed to show that this factor weighs heavily 
in favor of finding a violation of his speedy trial rights. This delay was a small 
part of the overall delay, and much less than the more than five months of delay 
that Risdon actively sought in this case. 
Risdon's claim that this final period of delay was not justified fails, 
however. As determined by the district court "the action of the forensic lab [in 
declining retesting] was pursuant to its policy, [and] was in good faith considering 
the limited resources of the lab and expenses involved .... " (R., P 94.) Given 
that the first testing took over five months to complete there was also no 
guarantee that retesting would have sped up the process. In short, Risdon has 
failed to show that reasons for the state's requested continuances were not valid 
reasons to seek delay and has therefore failed to show any unjustified delay. 
Because much of the delay was sought by Risdon and the additional delay was 
constitutionally justified, this factor weighs against Risdon. 
3. Risdon Did Not Timely Assert His Constitutional Speedy Trial 
Rights 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant 
asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his 
right is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the 
defendant is being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; State v. 
Davis, 141 Idaho 828,839-40,118 P.3d 160,171-72 (Ct. App. 2005). "Failure to 
assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he or she was 
denied a speedy trial." Davis, 141 Idaho at 839,118 P.3d at 171. Likewise, 
failure to assert the right "is closely related to and affects other Barker factors, 
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including prejudice and reasons for the delay." State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 
353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (et. App. 2007). 
The district court found that Risdon did not assert his constitutional speedy 
trial rights until his motion to dismiss was filed shortly before the January 24, 
2011 trial date. (Tr., p. 29, L. 23 - p. 30, L. 2.) In conjunction with that motion, 
Risdon in fact requested another continuance of the trial. (R., p. 46.) Risdon 
argues that he asserted the right by not waiving his speedy trial rights. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 40.) The record reflects that when the first continuance 
came up the trial court stated that continuing would create "a speedy trial issue, 
unless [Risdon was] waiving speedy triaL" (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1-3.) Risdon's counsel 
(Risdon was not present) responded, "You're putting me in a real dilemma, Your 
Honor." (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 4-5.) At best this can be viewed as trial counsel indicating 
he has no authority from his client to waive his client's statutory speedy trial 
rights. Risdon has failed to show error in the district court's finding that 
constitutional speedy trial rights had not been affirmatively asserted by Risdon. 
Moreover, the record shows that speedy trial was not a priority to Risdon 
until he felt he could potentially prevent the state from using its strongest 
evidence. As shown above, Risdon alone or by stipulation with the state delayed 
this case five months to get DNA test results. Obviously he hoped these results 
would prove helpful by establishing he was not in fact the father of the victim's 
baby. Only after the results proved helpful to the state was delay related to DNA 
evidence unacceptable. The record establishes that Risdon employed his 
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speedy trial rights tactically, rather than in good faith from the beginning of the 
case. This factor weighs heavily against any speedy trial violation. 
4. Risdon Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Prejudiced By 
The Delay 
The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature 
and extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 
Idaho at 840,118 P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants 
which the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those 
interests are (1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153 
P.3d at 1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840,118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is 
the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense 
'skews the fairness of the entire system.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P.3d at 
1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 
990 P.2d 742,749 (Ct. App. 1999». "[A]nxiety by itself is generally insufficient to 
support a claim of a speedy trial violation." State v. Crockett, _Idaho _,263 
P.3d 139, 143 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Risdon was arrested on October 28, 2009 (R., p. 49) and released and 
allowed to go out of state on February 10, 2010, pursuant to stipulation (R., pp. 
27-28.) Risdon claimed only emotional and financial prejudice from the pending 
charges. (R., pp. 59-60.) The district court found that Risdon "was not unduly 
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prejudiced by the delay occasioned by [the scientist's] medical condition in light 
of [Risdon's] failure to claim any violation of speedy trial until just recently." (R., 
p.94.) Given that Risdon sought delay when he thought it would benefit him, the 
district court's analysis is well supported. 
Risdon does not dispute the district court's finding on appeal, other than to 
generally claim that the court failed to adequately consider the effects of his 
incarceration and emotional trauma. (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-37, 40-41.) 
However, Risdon's claims of emotional trauma and incarceration ring hollow in 
the face of Risdon's willingness to seek delay when he was incarcerated and 
thought delay would benefit his case, as well as his request for a continuance of 
the January 12, 2011 trial date so that he could pursue the very motion to 
dismiss he claims was wrongfully denied. It is apparently only when delay does 
not benefit him that he suffers emotional or other prejudice. The district court 
properly rejected Risdon's claims of prejudice. 
5. A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A 
Speedy Trial Violation 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, 
must be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a 
speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, although the 
length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis, the factors, 
on balance, weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation. Discounting the 
five months of delay affirmatively requested by Risdon the total delay in this case 
was only about nine months. The delay occasioned by the state was for the 
constitutionally justified reason of a witness being unavailable for medical 
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reasons. Risdon failed to timely assert his constitutional speedy trial rights, and 
in fact sought delay when it benefited him. Finally, Risdon failed to demonstrate 
that he was unfairly prejudiced by the delay. Risdon has therefore failed to show 
error in the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered in this case. 
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